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Abstract 
The Supreme Court decision in Ivey v Genting Casinos rejected the two stage test for 
dishonesty set out in R v Ghosh and replaced it with a single, objective test which transcends 
both criminal and civil law.  This article asks whether it was correct to create a single test for 
dishonesty and in doing so, what role will subjectivity now play in the criminal law’s 
application of what is considered dishonest behaviour.  Historically, the civil courts have beset 
with confusion as to the role of subjectivity in the test for dishonesty in light of Royal Brunei 
Airlines v Tan.  The author will consider whether lessons can be learned from the civil courts 
and whether similar problems will trouble criminal law, particularly in light of criticism of the 
Ivey test and a preference, by some, for subjectivity to play a greater role in criminal liability 
for theft and other dishonesty offences.  
 
Introduction 
In criminal law, the issue of dishonesty in certain property offences1 is considered a 
fundamental ingredient2 in finding criminal liability.  However, the concept of dishonesty is 
only partially defined in statute, with section 2 of the Theft Act 1968 providing examples 
where a person is not acting dishonestly.  Namely when he is acting in a belief that he has a 
right in law3, a belief that the other person would consent to his taking of the property4 or 
that he is acting under a belief that the owner of the property could not be found by taking 
reasonable steps5.  The statute fails to define the concept of dishonesty, leaving it to the 
criminal courts to provide their own definition.  Elliott suggests that the word ‘dishonestly’ 
                                                          
1 For example theft under s.1 of the Theft Act 1968 and Fraud set out under s.1 Fraud Act 2006 
2 As Per Edmund Davies LJ in R v Royle [1971] 1 WLR 1764 at 1770 
3 S.2(1)(a) Theft Act 1968 
4 S.2(1)(b) Theft Act 1968 
5 S.2(1)(c) Theft Act 1968 
should not, in theory, be a difficult concept to define, however, it has been a case of the 
judges making a rod for their own back, with anyone trying to pin down ‘dishonesty’ in English 
case law soon finding that he is aiming at a constantly moving target.6  Until recently the 
accepted test for dishonesty was set out in R v Ghosh7, Lord Lane CJ providing a two stage test 
where the jury must first of all decide whether ‘according to the ordinary standards of a 
reasonable and honest people what was done was dishonest.’8  If they believe that this is the 
case they must then apply a subjective test to determine ‘whether the defendant himself 
realised what he was doing was by those standards dishonest’.9   
A contrast between the criminal and civil law approaches to dishonesty emerged, by virtue of 
cases such as Royal Brunei Airlines v Tan10, Barlow Clowes v Eurotrust11 and Abou-Rahman v 
Abacha12 where an objective approach to dishonesty was favoured by the latter.13  Civil law 
has not been without its own problems in this area however, as the judiciary struggled to 
come to terms to what extent the role of the defendant’s subjectivity should play within the 
role of the equitable tort of dishonest assistance in relation to a breach of trust.  The recent 
decision in Ivey v Genting Casinos14 provided the Supreme Court an opportunity to clarify the 
civil law test for dishonesty, and in doing so, the Court made obiter statements criticising the 
criminal approach set out in Ghosh.  It is argued that due to the unanimous nature of the 
Supreme Court’s decision, the reasoning of Ivey v Genting Casinos is to be adopted by the 
criminal law and has created a uniform test for dishonesty in the civil and criminal courts.15   
This article will consider the confusion encountered when balancing the objective test with 
the subjective knowledge of the defendant which has historically maligned the equitable tort 
of dishonest assistance and ask whether the decision in Ivey v Genting Casinos has provided 
a satisfactory resolution to this problem.  With an apparent unification of the civil and criminal 
                                                          
6 D. Elliott, ‘Dishonesty in theft: a dispensable concept’ [1982] Crim LR, 395 
7 [1982] QB 1053 
8 Ibid. at 1064 
9 Ibid. 
10 [1995] 3 All ER 97 
11 [2005] UKPC 37 
12 [2006] EWCA Civ 1492 
13 A. Hudson, ‘Current legal problems concerning trusts, fiduciaries and finance’ (2006) JIBLR, 21(3), 149 
14 [2017] UKSC 67 
15 A. Jackson, ‘Goodbye to Ghosh: the UK Supreme Court clarifies the proper test for dishonesty to be applied 
in criminal proceedings’ (2017) J Crim L, 81(6), 448 
tests for dishonesty, it is important to ask what lessons can be learnt from the civil law when 
applying an objective test for dishonesty in criminal law going forwards.   
 
The Ghosh test 
Prior to Ghosh, the case of Feely16 had set the criminal law test for dishonesty purely on 
objective terms.  Lawton LJ finding that the jury were entitled to adjudicate whether ‘the man 
who takes money from a till intending to put it back and genuinely believing on reasonable 
grounds that he will be able to do so’17 was acting honestly based on ‘the current standards 
of ordinary decent people.’18 
Ghosh19 concerned a surgeon acting as a locum consultant at a hospital who falsified claims 
in order to obtain money that he was owed for other work that he had carried out previously.  
The Court of Appeal considered whether he had the requisite mens rea of dishonesty under 
the offence of obtaining property by deception contrary to section 15 of the Theft Act 1968.  
In rejecting Feely, Lord Lane CJ argued that if Parliament, in its use of the term ‘dishonesty’ in 
the Act, intended to describe a state of mind, then ‘the knowledge and belief of the accused 
are at the root of the problem.’20  A man visiting from another country where public transport 
is free, travelling on a bus without paying in this country, would be unfairly dishonest if judged 
objectively21; his lordship concluding that ‘Parliament cannot have intended to catch 
dishonest conduct…. to which no moral obloquy could possible attach.’22  The prospect of an 
unadorned objective test was resisted on the basis that ‘if the mind of the accused is honest, 
it cannot be deemed dishonest merely because members of the jury would have regarded it 
as dishonest to embark on that course of conduct.’23   
                                                          
16 [1973] QB 530 
17 Ibid. at 541 
18 Ibid. at 538 
19 [1982] QB 1053 
20 Ibid. at 1063 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid. at 1064 
Griew24 points out that the objective limb in Ghosh deviates from that in Feely with Lord Lane 
replacing the term ‘ordinary decent people’ in favour of ‘honest people’.25  Although this may 
be a matter of mere linguistics, it was not necessarily helpful in maintaining clarity in this 
regard.   Regardless, he question’s Lord Lane’s interpretation of the Feely test on the basis 
that his lordship seems to do away with a holistic view of the conduct of the accused with 
Griew arguing that his should be done ‘in the context of the state of mind in which he did it.’26  
The implication is that the Ghosh direction considers the dishonesty of the actions alone, 
independent of the defendant’s frame of mind at the time.  As Griew puts it: 
The question is not… whether the employee who takes money from a till… is dishonest in doing 
so and therefore guilty of theft; the question is rather he is guilty of theft, because dishonest, 
when he “takes money from the till intending to put it back and genuinely believing… that he 
will be able to do so”.27 
The Law Commission suggest that ‘[c]entral to Feely and Ghosh is the insistence that 
“dishonesty” is an ordinary word…  But even [so]… there is no guarantee that all speakers of 
the language will agree as to its application, particularly in marginal cases.’28  A move to 
purely objective approach to dishonesty risks a defendant gambling on a trial rather than 
entering a guilty plea in the chance that those ‘ordinary and decent people’ may apply 
different standards than he himself possessed.   Thus Griew suggests that this may result in 
more drawn out trials when prior to Feely ‘the defendants might have felt constrained to plead 
guilty.’29  This is supported by a notion that it is naïve to suppose that there is a single, uniform 
standard of ordinary decent people within society.30  Williams submits that ‘[t]he practice of 
leaving the whole matter to the jury might be workable if our society were culturally 
homogeneous, with known and shared values’31 but ‘[s]ince the jury are chosen at random, 
                                                          
24 E. Griew, ‘Dishonesty:  The objections to Feely and Ghosh’ [1982] Crim LR, 341 
25 Ibid. at 342 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Law Commission Consultation Paper, Legislating the Criminal Code: Fraud and Deception (1999), No. 155 at 
5.16 
29 Above n.24 at 343 
30 Ibid. at 344 
31 D. Baker ‘Glanville Williams: Textbook on Criminal Law’ (4th Edition, Sweet & Maxwell,2015) 1335 
we have no reason to suppose that they will be any more honest and “decent” in their 
standards than the average person.’32 
A simple subjective test, on the other hand, is problematic when dealing with circumstances 
such as those in R v Gilks33 where the accused believed that when dealing with a bookmaker 
he was entitled to keep any winnings paid to him in error and that there was nothing 
dishonest in doing so.  Although Williams suggests that the objection to the approach is ‘the 
judges’ supposition that the defendant was entitled as a matter of law to set his own 
standards’34, ‘subjectivism of this degree gives subjectivism a bad name.’35  He reasons that 
the ‘subjective approach to criminal liability, properly understood, looks to the defendant’s 
intention and to the facts as he believed them to be, not to his system of values.’36  Professor 
Smith agrees, adding that the rule tends to abandon all standards other than that of the 
accused himself, in the determination of his responsibility.37 
The introduction of the hybrid, two stage test of Ghosh seemed a compromise on behalf of 
Lord Lane CJ to mitigate cases such as Gilks.  By including reference to the ordinary standards 
of reasonable and honest people in the first limb of the Ghosh test, his lordship was confident 
that: 
Robin Hood or those ardent anti-vivisectionists who remove animals from vivisection 
laboratories are acting dishonest, even though they may consider themselves to be morally 
justified in doing what they do, because they know that the ordinary people would consider 
these actions to be dishonest.38 
His Lordship considered the example from Boggeln v Williams39, where D believed that he 
would be continued to be billed after reconnecting his previously cut-off power supply and 
therefore refuted any dishonesty on his part. His lordship conceded that this would be a 
                                                          
32 Ibid. 
33 [1972] 1 WLR 1341 
34 D. Baker ‘Glanville Williams: Textbook on Criminal Law’ (4th Edition, Sweet & Maxwell,2015) 1337 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Boggeln v Williams [1978] Crim LR 242 
38 R v Ghosh [1982] QB 1053 at 1064 
39 [1978] 1 WLR 873 
borderline case in which the jury would be entitled to consider if the defendant in that case 
was merely disobedient or impudent rather than dishonest.40 
The outcome in Ghosh removes the strident nature of the objective test whilst also preventing 
a thief’s charter provided by a purely subjective test but in doing so, created confusion in the 
form of the second limb of the test.41  Halpin highlights that the appeal of the Ghosh test is 
that it appears to strike an effective compromise but ‘[u]pon further examination… we find 
within it not a stable compromise but a continuing tension between the subjective and 
objective approaches…’42  Mellisaris labels the test as being ‘vague and indeterminate’.43   
Campbell warns that ‘no one should be seduced into thinking that it is a test of pure social 
fact… it is a partially idealised test with a necessary component of moral evaluation which will 
vary from jury to jury.’44  Glover, in agreeing with earlier criticisms by Griew45, suggests that 
as a ‘consequence of the nebulous nature of the Ghosh test, and reliance on the assumption 
of jurors’ innate knowledge of dishonesty, the law appears uncertain and unpredictable’46 and 
therefore contravenes the rule of law.47  It is suggested that the test’s second limb is not 
necessary as juries should take into account the defendant’s circumstances whilst applying 
the first limb anyway as a standard of dishonesty is not considered in vacuo.48   
Spencer takes exception to the retention of a subjective limb of the test suggesting that this 
allows a defendant to advance a defence of mistake of law by arguing that he believed society 
would have tolerated his behaviour49, concluding that for ‘the courts to take their criminal law 
from the Clapham omnibus is one thing; to take it from the man accused of stealing is quite 
another.’50 Williams notes that ‘Lord Lane may have considered his judgement as a rescue 
operation, but if so, it is a rescue that still leaves this heroine in considerable peril.’51  Wasik, 
                                                          
40 See n. 38 
41 D. Ormerod ‘Smith and Hogan’s Criminal Law’ (13th Edition, OUP, 2011) 830 
42 A. Halpin, ‘The test for dishonesty’ (1996) Crim LR, 283 at 286 
43 E. Mellisaris ‘The concept of appropriation and the offence of theft’ (2007) 70(4), MLR, 581 
44 K. Campbell, ‘The test of dishonesty in R v Ghosh’ [1984] CLJ, 43(2), 349 at 359 
45 See above, n. 24 
46 R.Glover, ‘Can dishonesty be salvaged?  Theft and the grounding of the MSC Napoli’ (2010) J Crim L, 74(1), 53 
at 59 
47 See A. Ashworth, ‘Principles of Criminal Law’ (5th Edition, OUP, 2006) 74-76 
48 K. Campbell, ‘The test for dishonesty in R v Ghosh’ (1984) 43(2), CLJ, 349 at 353 
49 J. Spencer, ‘Dishonesty:  What the jury thinks the defendant thought the jury would have thought’ [1982] 
CLJ, 222 at 224 
50 Ibid. 
51 D. Baker ‘Glanville Williams: Textbook on Criminal Law’ (4th Edition, Sweet & Maxwell,2015) 1338 
supported a two stage approach suggesting that if a jury were to consider the standards of 
ordinary people, it would not be contradictory in requiring them to take into account whether 
the accused believed his conduct was honest or not.52 In its report on Fraud53, The Law 
Commission concluded that ‘[m]any years after its adaption, the Ghosh test remains, in 
practice, unproblematic.’54  Indeed, Spencer had argued at the time that ‘sooner or later, the 
question of dishonesty is bound to make its appearance in the House of Lords’55, where the 
slate could be wiped clean and a new definition for dishonesty be provided.56  Yet, the Ghosh 
test remained the accepted test for the next thirty-five years until the Ivey decision swept it 
aside. 
 
Dishonesty in civil law – dishonest assistance 
In Barnes v Addy57 Lord Selborne recognised that strangers to a trust can be personally liable 
to account as a constructive trustee to beneficiaries of a trust for any loss caused if they assist 
a breach of trust ‘with knowledge in a dishonest and fraudulent design on the part of the 
trustee.’58  This concept of ‘knowing assistance’ moved towards ‘dishonest assistance’ in Royal 
Brunei Airlines v Tan59 where, when considering dishonesty in this context, Lord Nicholls 
purported to put forward an objective test for dishonesty stating that ‘dishonestly… means 
simply not acting as an honest person would in the circumstances.  This is an objective 
standard.’60 
Despite this clear statement, confusion creeped into the law due to his subsequent comments 
referencing a subjective element, suggesting that ‘Honesty… does have a strong subjective 
element in that it is a description of a type of conduct assessed in the light of what a person 
actually knew at the time, as distinct from what a reasonable person would have known or 
appreciated.’61  The question therefore is whether Lord Nicholls intended the test in Royal 
                                                          
52 M. Wasik, ‘Mens rea, motive and the problem of “dishonesty” in the law of theft’ [1979] Crim LR, 543 at 556  
53 Law Commission, Report No. 276, Fraud (2002) 
54 Ibid. at 5.18 
55 Above n. 49 at 225 
56 Ibid. 
57 (1874) 9 Ch App 244 
58 Ibid. at 252 
59 [1995] 2 AC 378 
60 Ibid. at 389 
61 Ibid. 
Brunei Airlines v Tan to be that of a purely objective nature or whether it should involve some 
element of subjectivity.  It is argued that on a holistic reading of Lord Nicholls judgement, the 
repeated emphasis on an objective standard of dishonesty seems to suggest that the former 
is the correct interpretation of his Lordship’s decision.62   
Yet, Lord Hutton in Twinsectra v Yardley63 disagreed.  In analysing the possible approaches to 
civil dishonesty, he identified three possible options, the subjective approach (Robin Hood 
test), the objective approach and a combined test similar to that set out in Ghosh.64 His 
interpretation of the Tan test was this must be a version of the combined (Ghosh) test.  He 
cited the statement from Lord Nicholls that ‘[u]ltimately… an honest person should have little 
difficulty in knowing whether a proposed transaction… would offend the normally accepted 
standards of honest conduct’65, highlighting the use of the word ‘knowing’ as being crucial in 
this context.  His lordship stating that the use of the word would be ‘superfluous if the 
defendant did not have to be aware that what he was doing would offend the normally 
accepted standards of honest conduct.’66  Hudson describes Lord Hutton’s approach as an 
awkward ‘combination of an alteration of [the] Tan test and yet a purported approval of it by 
the House of Lords’67 adding that by emphasising the role of knowledge in the test is 
‘unfortunate because the test for dishonesty was developed precisely to move away from tests 
of knowledge.’68  Lord Millet however, dissenting, argued that Lord Nicholls had purposely 
avoided adopting the Ghosh approach69 and had instead adopted an objective test which 
would be applied after considering the defendant’s experience, intelligence and knowledge 
of the circumstances at the time.70  This, however, did not make it necessary that ‘he should 
actually have appreciated that he was acting dishonestly; it is sufficient that he was.’71  
Although Lord Millet was unable to persuade the rest of the Court in this case, his 
interpretation of Lord Nicholls’ words is preferred in academia over the much maligned 
                                                          
62 A. Hudson ‘Equity and Trusts’ (9th Edition, Routledge, 2017) 787 
63 [2002] UKHL 12 
64 Twinsectra v Yardley [2002] UKHL 12 at para 27 
65 Royal Brunei Airlines v Tan [1995] 2 AC 378 at 391 
66 Twinsectra v Yardley [2002] UKHL 12 at para 32 
67 Above n. 62 at 793 
68 Ibid. 
69 Above n. 66 at para 114 
70 Ibid. at para 121 
71 Ibid. 
approach taken by Lord Hutton.72  As Ryan puts it, Lord Millett’s approach ‘arguably reflected 
more accurately the approach… in Royal Brunei, who had… expressly rejected any 
requirement of consciousness on the part of the defendant that his conduct would be 
considered dishonest by ordinary persons.’73 
In Barlow Clowes v Eurotrust74 the Privy Council seemed to reaffirm Lord Nicholls’ test for 
dishonesty in Tan.75  In explaining away the distortion created by Twinsectra, Lord Hoffman 
suggested that he had not departed from the test in Tan and that: 
The reference to “what he knows would offend normally accepted standards of honest 
conduct” meant only that his knowledge of the transaction had to be such as to render his 
participation contrary to normally acceptable standards of honest conduct. It did not require 
that he should have had reflections about what those normally acceptable standards were.76 
Ryan77 describes this approach as ‘something of a volte face via a judgment that disavows the 
existence of any divergence between its earlier advice in Royal Brunei and the later approach 
of the House of Lords in Twinsectra.’78 Yeo adds that the clarification is unconvincing.79  
Penner suggests that ‘this would appear to be an implausible interpretation of Lord Hutton's 
leading judgment on the dishonesty point in Twinsectra.’80  Conaglen and Goymour, while 
welcoming the Privy Council’s conclusions suggested that ‘the sleight of hand in Eurotrust is 
apparent: the test in Twinsectra was not ambiguous but has been changed in Eurotrust so as 
to exclude the second limb of Lord Hutton's formulation in Twinsectra.’81 
Lord Hoffman’s, apparent, reinstatement of the test from Tan was endorsed by the Court of 
Appeal in Abou-Rahman v Abacha82 but in doing so, the test was inadvertently distorted.  LJJ 
                                                          
72 See for example, D. McIlroy, ‘What has happened to accessory liability is criminal’ (2004) 7 JIBFL 266; M. 
Thompson, ‘Criminal law and property law: an unhappy combination – Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley’ [2002] 66 
Conv 387 and R. Hunter, ‘The honest truth about dishonesty’ 8 July 2002, Financial Times, 11 
73 D. Ryan, ‘Royal Brunei dishonesty: clarity at last?’ (2006) Conv, 188 at 191 
74 [2005] UKPC 37 
75 Ibid. at para 10 
76 Ibid. at para 15 
77 Above n. 73 
78 Ibid. at 192 
79 T. Yeo, ‘Dishonest assistance: restatement from the Privy Council’ (2006) LQR, 122, 171 at 173  
80 J. Penner ‘Dishonest assistance revisited: Barlow Clowes International Ltd (in liquidation) and others v 
Eurotrust International Ltd’ TLI, 20, 122 at 123 
81 M. Conaglen & A. Goymour, ‘Dishonesty in the context of assistance – again’ (2006) CLJ, 65(1), 18 at 20 
82 [2006] EWCA Civ 1492 
Rix83 and Pill84 purported the test to include subjective knowledge on one’s dishonesty.  Lady 
Justice Arden, in her analysis declared that the decision in Barlow Clowes v Eurotrust 
‘represented the law of England and Wales’85 however she, just as Lord Hutton had done 
previously, placed weight into Lord Nicholls’ obiter statement regarding the knowledge of the 
defendant. Her ladyship concluded that although the test was predominantly objective ‘there 
are also subjective aspects of dishonesty.’86  Halliwell and Prochaska sum up the frustrations 
when they state that ‘it is a great pity that the fundamental principles that [Lord Nicholls] 
adopted have been relegated to an inordinate degree’87 adding that ‘[i]t seems yet again that 
semantic distinctions have denigrated the substantive test.’88  
 
The Ivey test for dishonesty 
In Ivey v Genting Casinos89 , concerning a gambler who cheated at Punto Banco Baccarat, the 
Supreme Court considered the role of dishonesty under s.42 of the Gambling Act 2005.   
Although the court concluded that dishonesty was not a necessary ingredient for cheating, 
Lord Hughes took the opportunity to flesh out the legal concept of dishonesty in English law. 
His Lordship was highly critical of the criminal law test for dishonesty set out in Ghosh stating 
that it benefited defendants with warped standards of honesty; too much reliance is 
unnecessarily placed on the defendant’s state of mind; it provides a confusing test for jurors 
to understand; it has resulted in a divergence between dishonesty in civil and criminal law 
and that the court in Ghosh were not required to make such a ruling.90  This adds to academic 
criticism of the test where it is argued that the second limb of the Ghosh test complicates 
criminal trials and can result in inconsistency due to additional grounds that can be 
contested.91  This is particularly problematic if faced with jurors, required to apply their own 
standards of honesty, whose standards may not live up to those of ‘ordinary decent people’ 
creating the danger of asking jurors to apply higher standards than they themselves attain, 
                                                          
83 Ibid. at para 23  
84 Ibid. at paras 93-94 
85 Ibid. at para 69 
86 Ibid. at para 66 
87 M. Halliwell & E. Prochaska, ‘Assistance and dishonesty: ring-a-ring o’roses’ (2006) Conv, 465 at 474 
88 Ibid. 
89 [2017] UKSC 67 
90 Ibid. at para 57 
91 E. J. Griew ‘Dishonesty: the objection to Feely and Ghosh.’ [1985] Crim LR, 341 
resulting in hypocrisy.92  Griew is also unconvinced that the Ghosh test rids the law of the 
undesired ‘Robin Hood’ defence where a defendant may claim to be ignorant that the conduct 
was dishonest by ordinary standards93 and it allows mistakes as to the law to be a valid 
defence.94 
In Ivey v Genting Casinos, Lord Hughes added to this criticism, stating that the ‘principle 
objection to the second leg of the Ghosh test is that the less a defendant’s standards conform 
to what society in general expects, the less likely he is to be held criminally responsible for his 
behaviour.’95  His lordship arguing that ‘[t]here is no reason why the law should excuse those 
who make a mistake about what contemporary standards of honesty are…’96 regardless of 
the context.  Although Lord Hughes acknowledged Lord Lane’s basis for the second limb of 
the Ghosh test being that criminal responsibility for dishonesty must be based on the 
accused’s actual state of mind, he rejected the presumption that the objective approach to 
dishonesty would preclude this.  His lordship argued that ‘[w]hat is objectively judged is the 
standard of behaviour, given any known actual state of mind of the actor as to the facts.’97 
Lord Hughes expressed preference for the civil test of dishonesty set out in Royal Brunei 
Airlines v Tan and adopted in Barlow Clowes v Eurotrust,  reasoning that ‘there can be no 
logical or principled basis for the meaning of dishonesty… to differ according to whether it 
arises in a civil action or a criminal prosecution.’98  Lord Hughes purported to adopt the civil 
test created by Lord Nicholls in Tan but explained it in the following terms: 
When dishonesty is in question the fact-finding tribunal must first ascertain (subjectively) the 
actual state of the individual's [genuine] knowledge or belief as to the facts… When once his 
actual state of mind as to knowledge or belief as to facts is established, the question [of 
dishonesty] is to be determined by… applying the (objective)’ standards of ordinary decent 
people. There is no requirement that the defendant must appreciate that what he has done is, 
by those standards, dishonest.99 




95 Ivey v Genting Casinos UK Ltd [2017] UKSC 67 at para 58 
96 Ibid. 
97 Ibid. at para 60 
98 Ibid. at para 63 
99 Ibid. at para 74 
In essence, what Lord Hughes set out was an objective test for dishonesty but where before 
applying this test, the ordinary and decent person is credited with the defendant’s knowledge 
or genuine belief of the facts at hand.  By removing the second limb of the Ghosh test, the 
approach in Ivey no longer considers whether the defendant subjectively realised that he was 
dishonest.  Horder explains the new approach using the example of the taking of a hotel table 
lamp.  One person takes the lamp believing that hotels have to put up with such a loss, the 
other takes the lamp because they misconceive a nearby sign stating that ‘all lighting is 
free’.100  Horder argues that whereas the former may have had a claim to acquittal under 
Ghosh, on the basis that he would not realise that ordinary decent people would find this 
conduct dishonest, but his defence would fail under the new Ivey test.   In contrast, the latter’s 
defence would likely succeed on the basis that her mistaken and rather naïve understanding 
of the sign would be taken into account.101   
Although Ivey was dealing with a civil appeal, Dyson and Jarvis argue that ‘the real reason the 
case of Ivey found its way to the UKSC was nothing to do with cheating at cards and everything 
to do with a desire to dispense with part of the Ghosh test for dishonesty.’102  Ivey now 
represents the civil law position in terms of dishonesty.  Although, in technical terms, Ghosh 
still remains the leading criminal law precedent, it seems logical, following the same 
justifications which allowed the Privy Council decisions in Tan and Barlow Clowes to overrule 
the Court of Appeal in Twinsectra, that Ivey will be adopted in future by the criminal courts 
too.  As Laird puts it: ‘It is trite law that the only part of a judgment that is binding is the ratio. 
However, the tone of the Supreme Court’s judgment strongly suggests that it intends for its 
obiter analysis of Ghosh to be treated as binding by lower courts.’103  
Indeed, in DPP v Pattison104 Sir Brian Leveson recognised the statements by Lord Hughes in 
Ivey to be strictly obiter and thus despite the High Court being bound by Ghosh, he advocated 
that ‘[g]iven the terms of the unanimous observations of the Supreme Court expressed by Lord 
Hughes, who does not shy from asserting that Ghosh does not correctly represent the law, it 
is difficult to imagine the Court of Appeal preferring Ghosh to Ivey in the future.’105  In R v 
                                                          
100 J. Horder, ‘Ashworth’s Priciples of Criminal Law’ (9th Edition, OUP, 2019) 402 
101 Ibid. 
102 M. Dyson and P. Jarvis, ‘Poison Ivey or herbal tea leaf?’ (2018) LQR, 134, 198 at 199-200 
103 K. Laird ‘Dishonesty: Ivey v Genting Casinos UK Ltd (t/a Crockfords Club.)’ (2018) Crim LR , 5, 395 at 397 
104 [2017] EWHC 2820 (Admin) 
105 Ibid. at para 16 
Pabon106, Lord Justice Gross stated that in light of Ivey v Genting Casinos ‘that second leg of R 
v Ghosh test has been disapproved as not correctly representing the law…’107  and that it is 
apparent that the jury, who had been given the Ghosh direction at trial, were ‘directed on a 
basis more favourable to the Appellant than if he were tried today.’108 
 
Conclusion 
Having changed the test for dishonesty, Clough suggests that this deals with the common 
criticism of Ghosh in that the second limb could create some absurd jury decisions.109  The 
new Ivey approach leaving ‘less room for manoeuvre’.110  Likewise, Galli suggests that the 
‘judgement is likely to be welcome for practitioners and jurors alike, but not those looking to 
rely on the distorted test for determination of dishonesty in order to circumvent the purpose 
of the law’111, arguing that the Ghosh test allowed the defendant’s belief ‘to undermine an 
objective standard’112 and the change removes that ‘vulnerability’113 by eliminating the 
subjective limb of the test.  Virgo114 contests this, suggesting that ‘there is no evidence from 
the cases that juries found the Ghosh direction difficult to apply’.115  
The mode of the change of law in Ivey also attracts widespread criticism.  Laird expresses 
surprise that not only Ghosh was rejected but more so in that this took place in a civil case.116 
He points out that Ghosh was not even considered during the appellate history of the Ivey 
case and as such, ‘Ghosh and its effect upon the criminal law was not subject to detailed 
scrutiny at any stage of the proceedings in Ivey’117 adding that this ‘perhaps explains some of 
the problematic omissions evident in the Supreme Court’s judgement.’118  First is the 
                                                          
106 [2018] EWCA Crim 420 
107 Ibid. at para 23 
108 Ibid. 
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110 Ibid. 
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presumption by Lord Hughes, in his judgement, that an ‘unprincipled divergence’119 between 
the civil and criminal tests was problematic.  Dyson and Jarvis brazenly suggest that the 
‘implication that there could be a principled divergence between civil and criminal concepts is 
welcome.’120 They add that ‘it is not clear that the function of dishonesty in the criminal law is 
the same as the function of it in the civil law…’ 121and that the civil judiciary can deal with 
complexity whereas a lay juries require simplicity.122  Spencer123 makes similar arguments 
stating that: ‘As unsuccessful defendants in criminal proceedings face consequences far worse 
than do unsuccessful parties to a civil action, a more generous interpretation of the dishonesty 
requirement in their favour can hardly be describes as “an unprincipled divergence”.124  Virgo 
adds that:  
Different tests of dishonesty could be justified because civil law dishonesty determines 
unacceptable conduct in order to impose liability, whereas dishonesty in the criminal law is 
concerned with identifying culpability, which requires consideration of the defendant’s mental 
state.  The effect of Ivey is to treat dishonesty in the criminal law as a mechanism for assessing 
conduct rather than culpability, albeit that the defendant’s knowledge or belief about the facts 
is relevant to this objective assessment.125   
Horder emphasises the importance of dishonesty in criminal law on the basis that it ‘its sphere 
of operation is enormous: around one-half of all indictable charges tried by the courts include 
a requirement of dishonesty.’126 As such, most of these cases are decided under the judicial 
test and he suggests that ‘even under the simplified Ivey test, that test is open to serious 
objections’127, particularly on the basis that the unfounded view by the courts that dishonesty 
is easily recognised128, it derogates from the rule of law due to ex post facto assessments of 
ones conduct129 and leaves room for ‘the infiltration of irrelevant factors’ in the court room.130   
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This change in direction must also be considered in light of cases such as R v Hinks131which 
considered the actus reus of theft and whether the appellant had appropriated £60,000 and 
a television set when she encouraged her 53-year-old male friend, Mr Dolphin, who was 
described as naive, gullible and of limited intelligence132; to donate the gifts to her.  Rose LJ 
confirmed that there was a distinction between the two separate ingredients of appropriation 
and dishonesty and that ‘appropriation can occur even though the owner has consented to 
the property being taken.’133  The result of this was that the entire issue of whether Ms. Hinks 
had committed theft therefore rested on whether the jury could be satisfied that she had 
acted dishonestly when she persuaded Mr Dolphin to give her the gifts.  As suggested by 
Beatson and Simester134 in order for this to have been a civil wrong the transaction must have 
been induced by a misrepresentation, duress or undue influence.135  But despite the absence 
of any of these inducements, as Beatson and Simester put it, ‘[i]t appears… that such 
despicable conduct, though with no civil consequences, may constitute a crime.’136  In essence, 
the offence of theft hangs on the dishonesty element, and, as a direct consequence of Hinks 
and Ivey, there is no longer a need to the defendant to either take another’s property 
adversely nor are they required to realise what they are doing is dishonest.  Spencer, who had 
previously been critical of the Ghosh test of dishonesty admits that ‘…36 years later, and on 
the other side of Gomez and Hinks, I confess that I have changed my mind’137 adding that ‘…the 
innocence of anyone who genuinely believes his conduct to be proper by the ordinary 
standards of honest and reasonable people can be seen as an important limit; and rejecting it 
extends the offence of theft yet further.’138  It is hard not to agree with Virgo’s concerns when 
he suggests that theft is now:  
[A] crime which requires neither proof of harm nor subjective fault.  Together with Hinks, Ivey 
has resulted in an unacceptable expansion of the criminal jurisdiction, one which is 
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inconsistent with the civil jurisdiction and so constitutes an unprincipled divergence between 
criminal and civil law.139 
Another concern is what the Ivey test does with Parliamentary supremacy in relation to the 
Fraud Act 2006.  During the passing of the Fraud Bill, Parliament would have had a perfect 
opportunity to depart from the Ghosh test but chose instead to remain silent on the issue.  
Laird suggests that ‘had Parliament intended for a specific test of dishonesty to apply, it could 
have made this explicit.’140 Dyson and Jarvis agree, suggesting that the Fraud Act 2006 does 
not include any exceptions to dishonesty, such as those found in the Theft Act 1968 s.2, 
because ‘Parliament did not feel the need to enact them in the new legislation because it 
intended the subjective limb of the Ghosh test to do the same work. ‘141 They add that ‘[n]ow 
that the subjective limb is gone, an unfortunate chasm opens up between theft on one hand 
and fraud on the other.’142 
It has already been observed that when the civil courts have been faced with a simple 
objective test, they have struggled to maintain this standard and in the cases of Twinsectra, 
Barlow Clowes v Eurotrust, and Abou-Rahman v Abacha a subjective element crept back into 
the respective judgements.  The case of R v Hayes143, decided under the Ghosh test and prior 
to the change brought about by Ivey is of particular interest.  Here a market trader was 
convicted of conspiracy to defraud when he manipulated the LIBOR rates to his advantage.  It 
was considered whether, when applying the objective limb of the Ghosh test, the jury could 
consider the general ethos of the banking system and evidence of market practice.  In 
rejecting this, the Court of Appeal suggested that this would ‘gravely affect the proper conduct 
of business’.144  They did, however, concede that this evidence would be ‘plainly relevant to 
the second subjective limb.’145  
However, in Hussein v FCA146, the Ivey test was applied when considering whether a trader 
had acted dishonestly when he influenced his employers LIBOR submissions to their 
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advantage.  The case was based around communication made by H to the bank’s LIBOR 
submitter and by providing information on his individual trading position this had improperly 
influenced the submissions.  H argued that the conversations were merely about internal 
hedging opportunities to protect his clients from interest rate fluctuations.  He argued that 
he did not believe the conduct to be improper and believed it to be good practice at the bank 
during this period.  Judge Herrington, accepted that: 
as a consequence of the test now formulated in Ivey…. the subjective element must be on what 
Mr Hussain knew about the definition of LIBOR…. in other words what did Mr Hussein 
genuinely believe were the factors that could be taken into account in determining the 
objective LIBOR rate… In that context it must also be taken into account what Mr Hussein 
believed as regards to how the information he provided… would be taken into account in 
determining UBS’s LIBOR submissions.147 
The implication here is that the formulation of the Ivey test, in which the jury are invited to 
consider the actual state of the individual's knowledge or belief as to the facts, leaves the 
door open for the courts to widen the scope of the test to introduce more subjective 
components.  Dyson and Jarvis speculate whether ‘the removal of the subjective limb shifted 
such awareness on the defendant’s part into the objective test, or does it just hang in the air 
as a piece of evidence unconnected to the issues in the case would be now?’148  It seems that 
on the basis of Hussain that the answer may be in the former.  Dyson and Jarvis point to other 
areas of criminal law where the objective standard can be informed by the defendant’s 
subjective view about the reasonableness of the conduct they perform, such as self-defence 
under s.76(7)(b) of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008.149  Their conclusion is that 
‘[t]here is precedent here for the courts to develop the objective limb left by Ivey by importing 
into it more subjective components.’150  This would allow the jury to take into account factors 
such as ‘”market practice” á la Hayes; and… the defendant’s belief in his or her own honesty 
by reference to the same standards to be applied to the jury.’151  It is submitted that decisions 
such as Hussein mark the first rung on this ladder and that the approach in Ivey is far from 
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settled, particularly in light of the historical struggles with similar tests faced by the civil courts 
and considering that merger of the civil and criminal tests for dishonesty opens up the 
criminal court to the unenviable task of interpreting Lord Nicholls’ words for themselves.  
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